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VADM V. P. de Poix, USN Director Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Admiral de Poix:

As you know, the Southeast Asia NIO is conducting a net assessment of the two sides in Vietnam.

of my staff has been

monitoring this effort. reports to me that it is a little embarrassing that there appears to be a good deal more precise information on the quantity and quality of enemy troops than there is on the RVNAF. As reported to me, the basic reason for this incongruity is that the responsibility for information on the RVNAF still rests with the plans and operational side of the JCS rather than with DIA.

I would appreciate any views you might have of this problem and if my staff can be of any assistance in the matter, we would be happy to cooperate.

Very respectfully,

DANIEL O. GRAHAM, LTG. USA

Daniel O. Graham Lieutenant General, USA Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

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Problems in Conduct of a Military Net Assessment in South Vietnam

REMARKS

1. PURPOSE: To recommend to Director of DIA that he take the necessary action to return responsibility for the analysis of the performance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces to the DIA.

2. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION:

- a. In following the ongoing net assessment, it is glaringly apparent that more is known by the community concerning the NVA/VC than about the RVNAF.
- b. This in no small part due to the fact that there is a separation of responsibilities, i.e., DIA/CIA follow the enemy and JCS (J-3/J-5) follows the RVNAF.
- c. We had to live with this <u>modus operandi</u> during the war years but it no longer makes sense (it never made much sense during the 60's either).
- d. I have tried to encourage the working level at DIA to make a move on this problem for the past year, i.e., to bring South Vietnam analysis into line with the analysis the intelligence community does everywhere else in the world. My efforts have been a dismal failure.
- e. I think the ongoing military net assessment gives us precisely the right leverage to get at this problem from an intelligence community viewpoint.
- f. I am persuaded that now is the right time to act on this. For too long the community has been hanging its analytical hat on the information that SIGINT has provided. There is no way that this level of SIGINT support will be funded in the future. We have little choice other than to intensify our more traditional means of analyzing the situation, i.e., HUMINT collection on the crucial question of the military balance.
- g. Right now, a good net assessment can't be done with DIA workers going hat-in-hand to J-3 for the necessary information on the RVNAF. (Andy Marshall's troops would have a great time dissecting the present quality of the net assessment now in draft.)

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h. I realize the DIA/J-3 problem; however, I am convinced that we should press D/DIA to take this action in the best interests of national intelligence.

3.	RECOMMENDED ACTION:	Recommend D/DCI/IC sign letter opposite	•
		Colonel, USMC	

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